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Originalism, together with textualism, has been of growing interest to legal scholars
and jurists alike. Discerning and putting forth the views of “the founders” has
become part and parcel of effective advocacy, particularly regarding constitutional
questions. Arizona is no exception, with its courts explicitly giving originalism
primacy over all other interpretive doctrines for discerning the meaning of an
ambiguous provision of its Constitution.
Yet, the Arizona state courts have not engaged with the views of the state’s founders
on key issues concerning the purposes of punishment, as demonstrated by the
founders’ words and deeds. Arizona was founded in 1912 as a progressive project,
and the founding generation—from the convenors of the 1910 Constitutional
Convention and the courts to the people themselves—held and acted on progressive
views of punishment. They rejected the idea that any person was beyond reform and
insisted that the state had an obligation to bring about reform of persons convicted
of crime. Progressive ideals were a core aspect of the founding of Arizona, and those
ideals provide a compelling reason to give independent meaning to Arizona’s bar
on cruel and unusual punishment in ways that call for judicial skepticism of any
punishment that does not serve the progressive ideals of rehabilitation and
reformation.
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INTRODUCTION
Arizona’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause must be understood
against the landscape from which it emerged, including its early judicial and political
history, as well as the words and deeds of the public at the time of its 1912
enactment. Across judicial philosophies, American jurists recognize the importance
of the original public meaning for understanding and applying constitutional texts.1
This holds for state and federal constitutions alike.
Arizona is no different, and the Arizona Supreme Court is explicitly
originalist in its approach to constitutional adjudication.2 In assessing the state
1.
See Thomas Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713,
729 (2011) (describing “old originalism” as an “attempt to follow the original public meaning
of the constitutional provision . . . .On this view, when original expectations can be
ascertained, the original meaning of a constitutional provision is determined and constrained
by the expectations of the framing generation as to how that provision would be applied to
particular problems.”).
2.
See Paul Avelar & Keith Diggs, Economic Liberty and the Arizona
Constitution: A Survey of Forgotten History, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 355, 359–60 (2017)
(“The Arizona Supreme Court has long held that some form of originalism is the proper
method to employ when interpreting the Arizona Constitution. Less than five months after
statehood, the court noted the ‘salutary rule of construction’ is to give ‘each and every clause
in a written constitution’ meaning ‘so that intent of the framers may be ascertained and carried
out.’”) (quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Osborne, 125 P. 884, 892 (Ariz. 1912)); see also Jeremy
M. Christiansen, Originalism: The Primary Canon of State Constitutional Interpretation, 15
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 368–69 (2017) (citing Rumery v. Baier, 294 P.3d 113, 116 (Ariz.
2013) (“The [Arizona] Constitution should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to
the intent and purpose of the framers and the people who adopted it.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Brewer v. Burns, 213 P.3d 671, 676 (Ariz. 2009) (same); Cain v. Horne, 202
P.3d 1178, 1181 (Ariz. 2009) (“In interpreting a[n Arizona] constitutional provision, our
primary purpose is to effectuate the intent of those who framed the provision.”) (internal
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Constitution, Arizona courts insist that “each provision must be construed so that it
shall harmonize with all others without distorting the meaning” as demonstrated by
the “objective meaning” at the founding.3 The Court’s originalist orientation4
extends to its assessment of the protections provided by Arizona’s prohibition on
“cruel and unusual punishment.”5 Yet—forsaking the context of that prohibition—
the Arizona Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly declined to recognize its
independent meaning to the state’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 6
Instead, while acknowledging that it will “not follow federal precedent blindly,”7
the Court has held that the state prohibition is coextensive with the Eighth
Amendment. It has done so because, in its view, there is no “compelling reason to
interpret Arizona’s cruel and unusual punishment provision differently from the
related provision in the federal constitution.”8

quotation marks omitted); Jett v. City of Tucson, 882 P.2d 426, 430 (Ariz. 1994) (“When
interpreting the scope and meaning of a constitutional provision, we are guided by
fundamental principles of constitutional construction. Our primary purpose is to effectuate
the intent of those who framed the provision and, in the case of an amendment, the intent of
the electorate that adopted it.”); McElhaney Cattle Co. v. Smith, 645 P.2d 801, 804 (Ariz.
1982) (“The governing principle of constitutional construction is to ascertain and give effect
to the intent and purpose of the framers of the constitutional provision and of the people who
adopted it.”); City of Apache v. Sw. Lumber Mills, Inc., 376 P.2d 854, 856 (Ariz. 1962) (en
banc) (“The governing principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent
and purpose of the framers of the constitutional provision and of the people who adopted it.”);
State ex rel. Morrison v. Nabours, 286 P.2d 752, 755 (Ariz. 1955) (“It is generally conceded
that a [state] Constitution should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intent
and purpose of the framers and the people who adopted it.”); Miller v. Wilson, 129 P.2d 668,
671 (Ariz. 1942) (concluding that a state constitutional provision was self-executing because
“it would have been impossible for the framers of the constitution to indicate more clearly
their intent” that it be self-executing); Crawford v. Hunt, 17 P.2d 802, 806 (Ariz. 1932) (“[I]n
the construction of [a state constitution] the whole paper ought to be considered, that the will
of its framers may be truly and accurately ascertained.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3.
State ex rel. Davis v. Osborne, 125 P. 884, 892 (Ariz. 1912); ANTONIN SCALIA
& BRIAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 30 (2012)
(“Subjective intent is beside the point. Speculation about it—even in the oddly
anthropomorphic phrase intent of the document—invites fuzzy-mindedness. Objective
meaning is what we are after, and it enhances clarity to speak that way.”).
4.
Although the Arizona Supreme Court occasionally speaks of original “intent,”
its mode of inquiry is more broadly originalist and avoids the “fuzzy-mindedness” Justice
Scalia has derided about such a subjective sounding inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Soto-Fong,
474 P.3d 34, 44 (Ariz. 2020) (relying on scholarship concerning labor movements at the time
of the founding and statements of delegates to interpret the scope of the protection provided
by a provision regarding child labor).
5.
ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 15; see Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d at 44. The Arizona Supreme
Court has described the state and federal proscriptions as “identical,” and, indeed, the only
difference between the text of the provisions is that the state prohibition references
“punishment” whereas the federal protection references “punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 15; Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d at 44.
6.
Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d at 44; State v. Bush, 423 P.3d 370, 393 (Ariz. 2018).
7.
State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 67 (Ariz. 2003); see Bush, 423 P.3d at 393.
8.
Davis, 79 P.3d at 68.
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Yet the contemporary Arizona state courts have not accounted for the
original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 9 The state
courts have not grappled with Arizona originalism: specifically, the words, actions,
and understanding of those who adopted its Constitution in 1912, the punishment
practices during the formative Progressive Era, and how protections against
excessive punishment fit into the state’s larger progressive project.10 This is a
significant gap both because Arizona’s Constitution is a prime example of early
twentieth century progressivism11 and because of the importance of state
constitutionalism for the development and understanding of individual rights.12 With
regards to the former, railroad and mining interests opposed many aspects of the
Constitution and used their influence in the press and elsewhere to resist progressive
reforms; progressives overpowered their counterparts (which consisted largely of
railroad and mining interests) at party conventions in the territory and were,
therefore, able to outmaneuver their opponents,13 and at the convention, they “deftly
used the convention process to select slates of delegates pledged to [progressive]
goals.”14 That history is essential to understanding the Constitution they adopted.
Likewise, modern state courts have failed to adequately consider how the
original understanding of other state constitutional provisions affects the scope of
protection from excessive punishment, though the Arizona Supreme Court has

9.
Other scholars have recently drawn on the historical landscape upon which the
Eighth Amendment was drafted to better understand the scope of its protections. See, e.g.,
John D. Bessler, A Century in the Making: The Glorious Revolution, the American
Revolution, and the Origins of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, 27 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 989, 998 (2019).
10.
A recent article has highlighted a similar gap in the historical analysis of the
non-delegation doctrine. See generally Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley,
Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (2021).
11.
See JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION 6–10 (2d ed. 2013)
(describing dominance of progressives at the Arizona Constitutional Convention).
12.
Jefferey S. Sutton, Response to the University of Illinois Law Review
Symposium on 51 Imperfect Solutions, 2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1393, 1399–1400 (2020) (“State
constitutions, like federalism itself, ultimately amount to neutral safeguards of freedom—
sometimes leaning against the government, sometimes leaning for it. Just ask Justice Brennan
and Justice Scalia. The former wrote a landmark article in support of independent state
constitutional rights in 1977 and the latter acknowledged their role in his last opinion for the
Court in 2016.”); Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights:
A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 1307, 1312 (2017) (“[R]edundancy in interpretive
authority—whereby state courts and federal courts independently construe guarantees that
their respective constitutions have in common—is one important way that our system of
government channels disagreement in our diverse democracy.”); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977)
(“The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit
the independent protective force of state law—for without it, the full realization of our
liberties cannot be guaranteed.”).
13.
LESHY, supra note 11, at 6–7.
14.
Id.; see also KIM ENGEL-PEARSON, WRITING ARIZONA 1912-2012: A
CULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHRONICLE 60 (2017) (“[T]he convention delegates
approved a constitution that was decidedly Progressive.”).
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recognized the importance of doing so.15 Indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia, the person
perhaps most singularly responsible for the rise of originalism, has made the same
point, as have both “sides”16 of the current Court: The original meaning is the
understanding of a text that an informed, reasonable member of the public, living at
the time of the text’s adoption, would have had.17 And, as discussed below, the
founding era is rich with information relevant to understanding the constitutionality
of extreme punishments in Arizona.
To date, little has been written about the original public meaning of the
Arizona Constitution or the dedication of the first Administration, early courts, and
residents to this original meaning,18 and virtually nothing has been written
concerning the early meaning of the state’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

15.
State v. Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d 34, 44 (Ariz. 2020) (“Express protections for
children were limited to children in the workforce. The delegates’ desire to protect children
manifests in article 18, section 2 of the Arizona Constitution, which prohibits ‘any child under
sixteen years of age [to] be employed in underground mines, or in any occupation injurious
to health or morals or hazardous to life or limb’ and disallows children under fourteen from
employment during school hours.”).
16.
See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 339; Thomas A. Schweitzer, Justice Scalia,
Originalism, and Textualism, 33 TOURO L. REV. 749, 750 (2017) (“The most important mark
Justice Scalia left on the Supreme Court may have been his advocacy of the jurisprudential
doctrines of textualism and originalism, which won wide acceptance on the Court, even
among his ideological rivals.”); Nina Totenberg, Trump’s Supreme Court Pick Is a Disciple
of Scalia’s “Originalist” Crusade, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/02/02/512891485/trumps-supreme-court-pick-is-a-disciple-ofscalias-originalist-crusade [https://perma.cc/CQE5-Q7ZF]; Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture:
A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARV. L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015)
https://hls.harvard.edu/event/the-scalia-lecture-a-dialogue-with-justice-kagan-on-thereading-of-statues/ [https://perma.cc/AE2N-FJ52] (“[W]e’re all textualists now.”); Statement
of Ketanji B. Jackson, The Nomination of Ketanji Brown Jackson to Be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Jud. Comm. H’rng, 117 Cong. (2022) (“The
Supreme Court now, very clearly, has determined that in order to interpret provisions of the
Constitution, we look to the time of the founding, and we ascertain, based on what the original
public meaning of the words the Constitution were at the time.”). Some proponents of
originalism have bemoaned its newfound prominence across judicial philosophies, claiming
that its dominance reduces it to a veneer to cover a judge’s other “commitments of political
morality.” Conor Casey & Adrian Vermeule, If Every Judge is an Originalist, Originalism is
Meaningless,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
25,
2022)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/25/if-every-judge-is-an-originalistoriginalism-is-meaningless/ [https://perma.cc/8HT8-L47E]. But a strength of original public
meaning is that the meaning is fixed, regardless of the priors of those seeking out that
meaning.
17.
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 435; Victoria Nourse,
Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and
the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1120 (2010) (“[S]tatutory interpretation must
hew to textualism’s original aim to embrace ordinary, public meaning and reject academic
textualists’ automatic resort to elite, legalist meaning.”).
18.
See John Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1,
59 (1988).
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punishment.19 Yet early state practices and legal doctrines limiting the use of
extreme sanction, as well as views of the state’s residents at the founding,
demonstrate a progressive approach to punishment that animated the constitutional
prohibition and should inform its meaning today. These include limitations on the
use of the death penalty, pre-trial detention, and harsh conditions of confinement,
all grounded in the progressive ideal that punishment must be directed towards
rehabilitation and re-entry into society.
Drawing on the historical primary sources,20 we conclude that there is a
stark disconnect between a proper Arizona originalism—grounded in early
twentieth century progressivism—and the state courts’ current interpretation and
administration of the Arizona Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
When viewed through an originalist lens, this clause should have a markedly
different meaning than its federal counterpart, one that provides substantially
broader protections against excessive punishments for the people of Arizona. In
particular, Arizona’s constitutional framers insisted that punishment must serve the
goals of reform and rehabilitation, believing that public safety was better served by
helping people return to society. Any punishment that forgoes these ideals—
including death, needlessly long prison sentences, and brutal conditions of
confinement—is unconstitutional.
Part I of this Article discusses the ways in which early twentieth century
progressivism at statehood was sharply critical of extreme sanction, employing
public statements and acts of the founding generation. Part II turns to the early public
meaning and interpretation of Arizona’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,
drawing on early court decisions. These early decisions are illuminating because
they long predate the federal incorporation of the Eighth Amendment against the
states in 1962, and therefore focus exclusively on the state provision and its

19.
A student note has argued that the lack of broad powers of executive clemency
necessitates giving independent meaning to Arizona’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, and litigators have pressed for broader protections under the state Constitution
than the federal. See generally Bradley N. Mumford, Make It Mean Something: The Case for
Broader Protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Arizona Constitution, 41
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 453 (2009); Marlee Russell, Note, Life ‘Or’ Death, 91 Miss. L.J. (forthcoming)
(making textual case for broader application Mississippi’s “cruel or unusual” punishment
clause than its federal counterpart based on Mississippi’s use of the disjunctive “or”); see also
State v. Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d 34, 44 (Ariz. 2020); State v. Bush, 423 P.3d 370, 393 (Ariz.
2018), State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 67 (Ariz. 2003); State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 828 (N.C.
1998) (stating that the North Carolina Supreme Court “historically has analyzed cruel and/or
unusual punishment claims by criminal defendants the same under both the federal and state
Constitutions”). But neither the extant scholarship nor the courts have addressed the role of
progressivism at the time of Arizona’s founding as a reason to provide different or broader
protection under the state constitution.
20.
Reliance on public sources of original meaning is particularly important in
Arizona, where, despite being relatively recent, the notes of the Constitutional Convention
are extremely limited. LESHY, supra note 11, at 11 (“Available minutes mostly merely record
dry details like attendance, opening and closing times, and the results of formal votes on
motions and propositions . . . . In light of the available information, it is practically impossible
to obtain a detailed, precisely accurate picture of the convention’s deliberations.”).
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meaning.21 Part III situates the Clause in the larger array of progressive rights in the
state Constitution and discusses the interplay of subsequently enacted constitutional
provisions. Finally, the Conclusion discusses the means by which proper Arizona
originalism would give new life to Arizona’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,
limiting state sanction—and the ultimate penalty in particular—in ways different
from its federal counterpart.22

I. PUBLIC MEANING OF EXTREME SANCTION IN ARIZONA
In 2017, the Arizona Supreme Court held that executing Joel Randu
Escalante-Orozco would be constitutional even though he was diagnosed with an
intellectual disability and was never able to pass second grade. The Court so held
because of the notion that he failed to demonstrate that the disability arose early in
life, during the developmental period.23 Escalante-Orozco’s ability to survive in a
“poor family in rural Mexico,”24 keep himself clean, care for farm animals, and work
at an assembly plant persuaded the Court that the condition must have started during
adulthood.25 Though it is well settled that “intellectual disability occurs in all races

21.
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (applying Eighth
Amendment protections to state convictions).
22.
Interpretations of other state constitutions have diverged at times from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 122
A.3d 1, 55 (Conn. 2015) (declaring the death penalty unconstitutional on the basis of the
Connecticut Constitution); State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (Neb. 2008) (deciding
electrocution as a method of punishment is unconstitutional despite U.S. Supreme Court
precedent In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890)).
23.
State v. Escalante-Orozco, 386 P.3d 798, 836 (Ariz. 2017).
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 835–36.
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and cultures”26 at early ages,27 the modern Arizona Court discounted his diagnosis
of intellectual disability in light of perceived cultural differences, and in so doing,
entered a ruling out of step with the original meaning of Arizona’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.
When enacted in 1912, the Arizona Constitution detailed a government of
checks, balances, and continuous responsibility to enforce the rights of residents of
all origins and cultures.28 It did so against a backdrop of opposition to extreme
punishment and, specifically, the death penalty. Progressive in design and purpose,
Arizona’s Constitution provided a sharp check on extreme punishments—including
limiting state power in light of a defendant’s mental health and intellectual
functioning—and promoted the ideal of rehabilitation. That public meaning is
reflected in the organization and wording of the whole document. The second part
of the document is titled “Declaration of Rights” and enumerates individual rights,29
including the prohibition on a conviction working “corruption of blood, due process
of law, the right to a writ of habeas corpus, limitations on conditions of confinement,
two separate provisions limiting excessive bail, and the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment.30 Other founding-era provisions also provide protections,
including a limitation on “[c]onfinement of minor offenders” and a requirement, in
the same provision, to fund correctional and penal institutions as well as “institutions
for the benefit of persons who have mental or physical disabilities.” 31
26.
Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., Protecting People with Intellectual Disability from
Wrongful Execution: Guidelines for Competent Representation, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107,
1127–28 (2018) (citing Escalante-Orozco, 386 P.3d at 835–36); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson
A Legal Obituary for Ramiro, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291, 324 (2017) (“According to the
Fifth Circuit, despite [defendant’s] multiple valid IQ scores in the sixties (all administered in
Spanish), and no valid score above seventy, the state court decided that the lack of more than
one full-scale IQ score using Mexican norms meant he had not met the burden of proving
substandard intellectual functioning. This reasoning, however, precludes every Mexican
national from Atkins relief, because there is only one Mexican-normed IQ test. To permit the
execution of Mexicans (and only Mexicans) because they have failed to produce results on
tests that do not exist is also blatant racial discrimination.”); Robert Sanger, IQ, Intelligence
Tests, “Ethnic Adjustments” and Atkins, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 87, 88 (2015) (concluding “ethnic
adjustments are not logically or clinically appropriate when computing a person’s IQ score
for Atkins purposes [because] . . . environmental factors—such as childhood abuse, poverty,
stress, and trauma—can cause decreases in actual IQ scores and which can be passed down
from generation to generation. Therefore, given that individuals who suffered these
environmental factors disproportionately populate death row, ethnic adjustments make it
more likely that individuals who are actually intellectually disabled will be put to death.”);
see also Cal. Penal Code § 1376(g) (2020) (forbidding ethnic adjustments to tests to
determine whether a defendant is ineligible for a sentence of death based on their intellectual
disability).
27.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 38–39 (5th ed. 2013).
28.
Leshy, supra note 18, at 59.
29.
ARIZ. CONST. art. II.
30.
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 14–16, 22.
31.
ARIZ. CONST. art XXII, § 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §§ 15, 16. Other provisions
also exemplify the progressive domination of the drafting of the founding document. For
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The public meaning of Arizona’s limitations on punishment is also shown
in the policies and practices of the founding generation, including those of George
W.P. Hunt, the president of the state’s 1910 Constitutional Convention who would
go on to serve as the state’s first governor.32 Two years prior to statehood, The
Holbrook News, a conservative platform at the time, advocated for the abolition of
capital punishment.33 The paper emphasized that the progressive movement—which
would come to dominate the state Constitutional Convention—opposed capital
punishment, even for murder, because of the movement’s focus on rehabilitation. 34
In one early decision, the Arizona Supreme Court explained that any “deprivation
[of liberty] should be conducted as humanely as possible, and with the view of
eventually, if that happy result is possible of realization, restoring him as a useful
citizen to society.”35 It also enjoyed widespread support. Hunt and his legion of
constituents outlawed the death penalty by ballot referendum in 1916 during his first
of seven terms as governor.36
As described below, at first, opponents of capital punishment faced
antagonism in the legislature and in editorial departments of major newspapers. At
the time, Arizona elites and pro-business interests harbored regressive views of
punishment. But Hunt’s progressive movement found support among the state’s
people. Signatures on ballot initiatives favoring abolition of capital punishment and
voters at the polls prevailed over floor speeches and editorials. The Arizona death
penalty was reinstated in 1918 only after reform opponents launched a backlash
campaign of the sort that America has seen many times, inciting fear about the
dangers of people released from prison early or before trial, “lynch law,” and
invoking statistics that falsely linked abolition to higher rates of homicide.
A. The First Administration
Hunt’s career in the territorial legislature provided notice of his and his
many supporters’ skepticism of extreme punishment. He promoted prison reform
and was president of the Anti-Capital Punishment League.37 Those positions did not

example, the constitution provides for recall of public officials, an initiative process for public
adoption of laws, and an entire article concerning labor interests, demonstrating the
“substantial presence at the Constitutional Convention of advocates for the rights of the
working class, or labor.” LESHY, supra note 11, at 381; see also ARIZ. CONST. arts. VIII,
XVIII, XXI.
32.
LESHY, supra note 11, at 10.
33.
Casmo Romilly, Reformation as a Crime Cure, HOLBROOK NEWS, Feb. 18,
1910,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn95060791/1910-02-18/ed-1/seq-6/
[https://perma.cc/FMG9-EBRQ].
34.
Id.
35.
See Howard v. State, 237 P. 203, 204 (Ariz. 1925).
36.
LESHY, supra note 11, at 10; see generally JAMES W. BYKRIT, FORGING THE
COPPER COLLAR: ARIZONA’S LABOR-MANAGEMENT WAR OF 1901-1921 (1982) (explaining
early progressivism in Arizona’s statehood and the extents to which East Coast business
interests went to undermine the otherwise popular progressivism of the state at its founding);
CLAUDE G. BOWERS, BEVERIDGE AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 379 (1932) (discussion of
political dynamics resulting in progressive domination at Arizona’s Constitutional
Convention).
37.
Leshy, supra note 18, at 37.
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hurt his popular appeal; he only ever lost one general and one primary election in a
four-decade-long political career.38 Frank C. Lockwood, a historian focused on the
southwest, described Hunt as a man of the people during territorial days:
His rude, crude strength; his defiance of money and the money
interests; his detestation of snobbery and pretension, whether social
or intellectual; his big-hearted humanity; and his extraordinary
intellectual shrewdness and political foresight, have made him the
trusted champion and advocate of the people and the scourge of the
unjust, the dishonest, and the autocratic.39

Although Hunt did not campaign for the position, he was nominated to
represent his town at the state’s 1910 Constitutional Convention.40 Hunt’s
colleagues elected him president of the Convention, even though he preferred a
friend for the role.41
As the first governor of the state of Arizona—and in contrast to the modern
reluctance of governors to ameliorate the excesses of criminal punishment via
clemency42—Hunt reprieved all executions until abolition became the law. 43 Hunt
also vetoed a bill that would take the power of pardon and reprieve from him and
place it with a Board of Pardons and Paroles.44 In 1912—the first year of

38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 37–38 (quoting Frank C. Lockwood, ARIZONA CHARACTERS 197 (1928)).
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 38.
42.
See Austin Sarat, Memorializing Miscarriages of Justice: Clemency Petitions
in the Killing State, 42 L. & SOC. REV. 183, 186 (2008) (noting that clemency in capital cases,
“despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s claim about its ‘frequency,’ has become quite rare.”).
Moratoria on the death penalty, in contrast, appear to be more common. See, e.g., Gov. Gavin
Newsom, Exec. Order N-09-19 (Mar. 13, 2019); Conrad Wilson, Oregon Department of
Corrections to Dissolve Death Row, OREGON PUBLIC BROADCASTING (May 15, 2020)
https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-death-row-general-population/
[https://perma.cc/RG88-2J74]; American Bar Association, Pennsylvania Governor Declares
Moratorium
on
Death
Penalty
(June
1,
2015)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/project_pres
s/2015/summer/pennsylvania-governor-declares-moratorium-on-death-penalty/
[https://perma.cc/QQ3U-CSC7].
43.
Modern governors have undertaken actions to limit reprieves of punishment.
In one extreme example, a governor vetoed the state legislature’s abolition of the death
penalty. Julie Boseman, Nebraska Bans Death Penalty, Defying a Veto, N.Y. TIMES (May 27,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/us/nebraska-abolishes-death-penalty.html
[https://perma.cc/KCU2-LM3A]. When the legislature overrode the veto, the governor used
his personal wealth to mount a ballot initiative to re-instate the death penalty. Pema Levy, A
Republican Governor Is Using His Own Money to Reinstate the Death Penalty, MOTHER
JONES (Nov. 1, 2016) https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/11/ricketts-nebraskadeath-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/Q9HG-MLTN].
44.
Legis. Hist., 1st Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. vol. 3 pt. 2, at 24, 31, 33 (Ariz. 1913),
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/p17220coll18/id/12. The pardon power
was already quite limited as compared to the federal clemency power and the related power
held by other governors. See Mumford, supra note 19, at 470–72.
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statehood—he postponed the hangings of five people45 and urged citizens to
circulate a petition proposing the abolition of the death penalty.46
Hunt also pushed for the legislature to follow his lead. During the state
legislature’s first regular session, Governor Hunt proposed reforms reflecting the
view that the goal of punishment is to rehabilitate the accused.47 His message to the
legislature advocated teaching the imprisoned employable skills that may prepare
them to re-enter society after rehabilitation has made them whole. He explained his
hope that inmates would
take their place in the world, and to honestly and successfully cope
with its problems when their debt to society has been paid . . . How
vastly better would it be to furnish some useful employment, whereby
the faculties might be kept alive and alert, hope sustained, the spirit
quickened, and a little money accumulated against the day when self
dependence [sic] is resumed!48

The statement also vowed adherence to “the belief held by millions, and
yet increasing millions,” that capital punishment is a relic of “barbarism” and has
“no place in modern civilization.” 49 He envisioned replacing capital punishment
with parole ineligibility to deter crime. “[A] more fearful and effective example to
others lies in the certainty of imprisonment than in the fleeting fear of death, a fear
which temporarily has no place in the passion-heated or drink-crazed brain.”50
Speaking on his view of the proper role of the state in response to crime,
Hunt focused on the “humane” treatment of incarcerated people. 51 On the specific
question of capital punishment, he linked his campaign to abolish the practice to the
state Constitution. Introducing his “Petition proposing Abolition of the Death
Penalty,” he explained that abolition was required by the values “embraced in our
Constitution.”52 While that proposal remained pending, he continued to provide
reprieve53 from executions until the legislature outlawed capital punishment or,

45.
George W. P. Hunt, Proclamation of Reprieve, COPPER ERA AND MORENCI
LEADER, Oct. 11, 1912, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn94050892/1912-10-11/ed1/seq-2/ [https://perma.cc/7RML-5SHG] (postponing sentences of William Campbell,
Eduardo Perez, N. B. Chavez, and Miguel Peralta).
46.
Capital Punishment, COPPER ERA AND MORENCI LEADER, Feb. 7, 1913, at 8,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn94050892/1913-02-07/ed-1/seq-8/
[https://perma.cc/F8ZS-4PUY] (reporting on prior reprieve and Gov. Hunt’s intention to
include “several thousand words of argument against capital punishment” in a forthcoming
speech).
47.
Legis. Hist., 1st Leg. Reg. Sess. vol. 1, at 67 (Ariz. 1912),
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/p17220coll18/id/17.
48.
Id. at 67.
49.
Id. at 68.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 413, 415.
52.
Hunt, supra note 45.
53.
ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 5 (“Reprieves, commutations and pardons. The
Governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutation, and pardons, after convictions,
for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such
restrictions and limitations as may be provided by law.”).
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failing that, until the people54 voted on the question. In the same breath, he called a
special session of the legislature to vote on a proposal banning capital punishment.55
Also as governor, in 1912, Hunt issued a proclamation that drew on the
progressive theory of human improvement, social science, and crime statistics to
effectuate these actions. He heralded Arizona’s foundation upon progressive
principles of “Humanity, Utility, and Economy,” and condemned the use of capital
punishment as lacking any utilitarian or deterrent function. He contrasted the
homicide rates of long-time abolitionist states of Michigan and Wisconsin with their
retentionist neighbor Ohio:
[F]or reasons that are apparent, [capital punishment] incites the Social
Consciousness to further violence and bloodshed as is shown by the
fact that the States leading in the number of legal executions also lead
in lynchings . . . while Michigan and Wisconsin . . . during the last
ten years had only half as many murders in proportion to population
as Ohio.56

Ultimately, in 1915, Hunt successfully prodded the circulation of a voter
initiative to abolish capital punishment and mandate a sentence of life imprisonment
for murder.57 He also placed an immediate moratorium on executions, which
remained in place until Arizonans cast ballots and abolished the death penalty at the
1916 general election.58
B. The Founding Legislature
During Hunt’s first term as governor, anti-death penalty legislators
unsuccessfully proposed similar mandates to outlaw the death penalty. For instance,
in the second year of statehood, Senator John T. Hughes, a framer, introduced Hunt’s
“pet measure,”59 an anti-capital punishment bill that would have submitted the
matter to a vote by the people.60 The Hughes bill died when the Judiciary Committee

54.
Hunt, supra note 45 (“I would desire, under the salutary provisions of the
Initiative embraced in our Constitution, to circulate a Petition proposing he Abolition of the
Death Penalty for Capital Crimes, and to secure the submission of the question to the Electors
of this State at a Special or General Election”).
55.
ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 4 (empowering the governor to “convene the
Legislature in extraordinary session,” in which“[h]e shall communicate, by message, to the
Legislature . . . the condition of the State, and recommend such matters as he shall deem
expedient”).
56.
Hunt, supra note 45.
57.
Second Extra Session Is Called –Of the List of Subjects Presented, Land
Legislation is Foremost—Abolition of Capital Punishment Recommended, THE PARKER POST,
June 5, 1915, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn95060922/1915-06-05/ed-1/seq-1/,
[https://perma.cc/VX7Y-TAQG].
58.
See Oh, This Miserable Fiasco!, ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, July 31, 1915, at 4,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020558/1915-07-31/ed-1/seq-4/
[https://perma.cc/C5BR-TN2M] (criticizing the reprieves of those sentenced to death and
predicting that “outraged public opinion will compel their execution”).
59.
Legis. Hist., 1st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. vol. 3 pt. 1, at 58 (Ariz. 1913),
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/p17220coll18/id/34.
60.
Id.
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rejected it by a 5–13 vote.61 Hughes had more success legislating other sanctioning
reforms,62 notably a mandatory indeterminate sentencing law with parole principle.
This reform was a part of the overall progressive project of rehabilitation and
restoring individuals to be contributors to society. Hughes also put through a bill
authorizing the purchase of a prison farm and legislation authorizing prisoners to
work on public roads, highways, and bridges, rather than simply languishing in
prison.63 Hughes believed that Arizona’s future “bids fair to outstrip all the States of
the Union . . . in the high and progressive character of its citizenship.” 64
Then, in the summer of 1915, House Representative Frank Pinkley floated
a bill that would both abolish the death penalty and restrict executive pardons.65 The
provision would bar the pardon of a capital offender unless later developments
demonstrated their innocence or disclosed mitigating circumstances not brought out
at trial.66 The legislation made it to the full House for a vote, but lost on the floor
12–1, with 5 members absent and 4 members excused.67 Speculation arose that the
absentees did not want to publicly commit themselves on the matter of the death
penalty because the legislators were unsure of the position of their constituents, and
hence evaded the roll call vote.68
Most legislators silenced their attitudes toward capital punishment and
followed the lead of vocal floor speakers to vote against anti-death-penalty
legislation.69 The floor speakers lamented Hunt’s use of execution reprieves to, as
they argued, defeat the law.70
It remained for Arizona residents to place the matter before the people at
the general election in 1916.71

61.
Id. at 61.
62.
JO
CONNORS,
WHO’S
WHO
IN
ARIZONA
368–69
(1913),
https://ia802803.us.archive.org/21/items/whoswhoinarizona00conn/whoswhoinarizona00co
nn.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HYB-YXL2].
63.
The founders’ push for a life sentence (with parole eligibility) replacement for
the death penalty and for prison labor reflect their orientation toward rehabilitation and doing
the least required to protect the public, rather than an endorsement of either practice per se.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Anti-Capital Punishment: House Debate, ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, June 4, 1915, at
4,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020558/1915-06-04/ed-1/seq-4/
[https://perma.cc/ER42-SLPH].
66.
Id.
67.
Legis. Hist., 2nd Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. vol. 4 pt. 3, at 27 (Ariz. 1915),
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/p17220coll18/id/38.
68.
Id. at 26–27.
69.
Legis. Hist., 1st Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. vol. 3 pt. 2 at 19, 25–30 (Ariz. 1913)
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/p17220coll18/id/12.
70.
Id.
71.
Legis. Hist., 2nd Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. vol. 4 pt. 3, at 28 (Ariz. 1915),
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/p17220coll18/id/38.
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C. The Fourth Estate of the New State
As with many national publications72 between territorial days and the
1930s, newspapers in Arizona were political instruments. Political bias provided
sustenance to publications headquartered in Phoenix. The town papers, in a city with
more newspapers than it could support, received kickbacks in the form of
government printing contracts.73 Fortuitously perhaps, Phoenix happened to be the
seat of three governments—city, county, and territorial.74 Usually, the newspaper
that supported the winning party could count on getting government printing
contracts. These contracts provided substantial income and could mean the
difference between surviving and finding other work.75
In 1890, Arizona Territorial Governor Lewis Wolfley established The
Arizona Republican (today’s Arizona Republic) admittedly as an organ76 of his new
Republican Administration, serving as his political arm and catering to business
interests. In the year following statehood, the structure of local government (and the
intertwined Republican press) changed when Phoenix voters, intent on maintaining
a progressive image, approved the adoption of the commission–city manager form
of administration.77 Considered an efficient, businesslike approach to the
management of city affairs, the utilization of this structural reform was widespread
in the smaller U.S. cities by the time of World War I.
The business elite that helped bring the commission–manager form of
government to Phoenix wished to create the image of a “civilized city” 78 by
establishing symbols of urbanism. The elite also promoted and supported schools,
and churches, libraries and theaters, and other sources of “refinement.” 79 The
women of Phoenix joined in the effort and sometimes led the way; the goal of the
Phoenix Women’s Club during this period was the “stimulation of culture” in the

72.
See William H. Lyon, “Live, Active Men, With Plenty of ‘Push’”: Arizona’s
Territorial Immigration Commissioners, 37 J. ARIZ. HIST. 149, 155–56 (1996); Scot Wrighton &
Earl Zarbin, Lewis Wolfley, Territorial Politics, and the Founding of “The Arizona
Republican,” 31 J. ARIZ. HIST. 307, 307 (1990) (explaining that The Arizona Republican
“appeared to be little more than another quarrelsome journal founded to serve narrow political
ends” when "the new daily unleashed a vile exchange of personal journalism and heated up
the already vigorous competition for advertising and subscription dollars in a town with more
newspapers than it could reasonably support”).
73.
Wrighton, supra note 72, at 322. (“Usually the newspaper that supported the
winning party could count on getting government printing contracts. These contracts provided
substantial income and could mean the difference between surviving and finding other
work.”).
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
See Lyon, supra note 72, at 155–56 (“Following [President] Harrison’s election,
the Tucson Citizen groomed itself to be the new [Republican] organ. It donned a new dress,
spiffed up its format and type, and touted Lewis Wolfley for governor . . . Wolfley, however,
had other designs. He established his own newspaper, the Arizona Republican, in Phoenix.”).
77.
Bradford Luckingham, Urban Development in Arizona: The Rise of Phoenix, 22 J.
ARIZ. HIST. 197, 202 (1981).
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
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capital city.80 As such, the desert hub played a vital role in bringing the “fruits of
civilization” to Arizona. Local leaders, like Chicago transplant Dwight Heard,
combining private interests with community interests, often directed local economic
and cultural life with growth and development in mind. He invested in The Arizona
Republican to exert a strong influence on politics and other aspects of life in Phoenix
and Arizona.81
As a corollary, The Arizona Republican’s sentiments toward punishment
were decidedly not progressive. Upon statehood, The Arizona Republican derisively
characterized capital punishment opponents as “humanitarians,” “socialists,” and
“anarchists.”82 On the opposite end of the political spectrum, in May 1913 The
Prescott Courier, a Democratic newspaper, called Hunt “our humane, honorable and
Christian governor.”83
Soon, however, editorial boards at conservative and liberal newspapers
were both shilling for a ballot initiative to end the debate between Hunt and
legislators. The Arizona Republican wrote “[s]o may it be. Let the question of the
abolition of the death penalty in Arizona be submitted to the people,” adding:
Let it be determined whether a majority of us regard a fiendish
murder as a misfortune rather than a crime; whether the fiendish
murderer is deserving of sympathy rather than censure; whether a
majority of us would encourage rather than discourage murder.
This matter will have to be settled in Arizona sometime, so that
the earlier it is settled, the better.84
In December 1915, as Hunt continued to delay executions and his
constituents rallied petitioners, The Arizona Republican did an about-face and
predicted that the people would vote for abolition in the 1916 election85:
We have thought that if the law as it stands had been carried out from
the time of the admission of Arizona to statehood, capital punishment
would have been abolished by the people last fall if it had not been
earlier abolished by a legislative act. We believe, now, that when the
question is presented again, if the people shall be given opportunity
to vote on a law that will as effectually remove murderers from
society as to hang them does; if the power of pardon and parole shall
be sufficiently restricted, and, if in the meantime the people are not
further irritated by interference with the law as it stands, capital
punishment will cease to be inflicted in this state. Taking human life

80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 202–03.
82.
Let This Thing Be Settled, ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, Apr. 3, 1913, at 4,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020558/1913-04-03/ed-1/seq[https://perma.cc/6N23-249H].
83.
Legis. Hist., 1st Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. Vol. 3 pt. 2, at 23 (Ariz. 1913),
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/p17220coll18/id/12.
84.
Let This Thing Be Settled, supra note 82.
85.
That Event at Florence, ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, Dec. 11, 1915, at 4,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020558/1915-12-11/ed-1/seq/
,
[https://perma.cc/6QM2-GY5D].
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by process of law is repugnant to all right-thinking-people. It has been
tolerated by them as a necessary evil.86

And the founding people fulfilled that prediction at the ballot boxes,
abolishing the death penalty.
D. The Founding People
The first generation of abolitionists may not have prevailed in the press or
in the statehouse, but their actions outpowered both institutions. Anti-capital
punishment advocates penned letters to the editor, tallied sentiment about abolition
at town meetings, circulated petitions proposing to outlaw death sentences, signed
enough of those petitions, and cast enough votes to enact the 1916 Arizona Abolition
of Death Penalty Act.87
One February 1913 letter to The Parker Post by Cibola resident A.D.
Nelson reflects the progressive thinking that ultimately led to abolition.88 He
declared that society has “progressed in its views” on the impetus of crime—
economic and social conditions—and recognized the inability of vengeance to stop
it. As such, his conclusion was that capital punishment “makes sense as a deterrent
only in barbaric minds.”89 Nelson’s opinions on the respective places for retribution
and rehabilitation resembled those of Hunt. He made the case that “there is good in
all men, which under proper conditions can be brought to the surface,” and thus, if
rehabilitation can help “a murderer to become again a useful member of society,”
then what “availeth it to kill him because he killed someone else?”90 In a note
preceding Mr. Nelson’s letter, The Parker Post editors sympathized with some of
his comments on prison reform but, in the same sentence, endorsed retaining the
death penalty.91
This was but one example where the elite opinion did not reflect the voice
of the people. Two years after Mr. Nelson penned his letter, a Williams County
abolitionist at a parish house “Men’s Smoker” event dominated a debate over
eliminating capital punishment.92 After an opponent presented his case, all attendees
discussed the issue. At the end of the evening, the attendees voted in favor of
abolishing the death penalty.93
That same year, the State Federation of Labor, an influential lobbying
group, particularly in the progressive circles that dominated the Constitutional
86.
Id.
87.
See John F. Galliher et al., Abolition and Reinstatement of Capital Punishment
During the Progressive Era and Early 20th Century, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 538, 552
(1992).
88.
Capital Punishment, PARKER POST, Feb. 22, 1913, at 2,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn95060922/1913-02-22/ed-1/seq-2/
[https://perma.cc/7RCW-2XZ2].
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Men’s Smoker; Capital Punishment Discussed Vote, 23 For, 29 Against,
WILLIAMS NEWS, Feb. 11, 1915, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82015761/191502-11/ed-1/seq-1/, [https://perma.cc/8MQW-2T7].
93.
Id.
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Convention, backed abolition.94 The Federation adopted a resolution to that effect,
as well as a resolution that petitioned the Board of Pardons and Paroles to provide
reprieve to condemned men at the State Prison until after the 1916 general election.95
The question was finally put to the voters in the 1916 election. Over elite
opposition in the legislature and the press, on November 17, 1916, Arizona voters
narrowly abolished the death penalty.96
E. The Reinstatement Period
After abolition, backlash from elite institutions was swift. The legislature,
the press, and even the Arizona Supreme Court stoked fears about prisoners escaping
jail or being released on parole, the threat of lynch law, and increased crime rates.
As this debate was unfolding, a historic gunfight left three police officers dead. 97
Death penalty proponents exploited this opportunity to incite fear and shift the
conversation on crime reduction away from progressive reforms and towards
reinstatement of the death penalty.98
The worries that instigated reinstatement in December 1918 largely mirror
those that proponents of capital punishment cited before abolition. For example,
immediately beneath Mr. Nelson’s 1913 letter championing rehabilitation, The
Parker Post republished an article published in The Arizona Republican reporting
(unsubstantiated) estimates that life-termers were set free within 10 years.99
The Arizona Supreme Court entered the political debate in its first postabolition opinion that mentioned the referendum movement. The case before the
Court involved prohibition, a different progressive project. 100 In resolving a narrow
question about “the nature of the discretion” that a court had to grant bail pending
appeal of a misdemeanor conviction, the Court suggested that abolishing capital
punishment had left the courts powerless to detain murderers pending trial. The court
suggested that because the “people of Arizona” had outlawed capital punishment,
“all persons charged with the crime of murder,” or other offenses, may “demand
admission to bail as a strict legal right, which no judge or court can properly
94.
Labor Wants Legislation, ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, Oct. 6, 1915, at 3,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020558/1915-10-06/ed-1/seq-3/,
[https://perma.cc/S75P-ANY4].
95.
Id.
96.
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PUBLICITY PAMPHLET, ARIZONA STATE LIBRARY
65
(1913),
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/api/collection/statepubs/id/10522/download. See also
Arizona Abolition of Death Penalty, supra note 87.
97.
WINSLOW
MAIL,
Feb
15,
1918,
at
2,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn96060765/1918-02-15/ed-1/seq/
[https://perma.cc/2XUT-HW5N].
98.
Lessened
Crime,
ARIZ.
REPUBLICAN,
Jan.
2,
1920,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020558/1920-01-02/ed-1/seq-6/
[https://perma.cc/E93S-E2PW] (minimizing effects of prohibition on reduced homicides and
calling for reinstatement).
99.
The Pardoning Power, ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, Feb. 19, 1913, at 4,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020558/1913-02-19/ed-1/seq-4/,
[https://perma.cc/Y2SK-WMUR].
100.
In re Welisch, 163 P. 264, 264 (Ariz. 1917).
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refuse.”101 The Court went further, suggesting that bail must be granted to
defendants facing murder charges no matter how “diabolical or atrocious [the
charge] may be, and howsoever evident may be the proof of guilt thereof.” 102 The
Court thus raised concerns that abolition necessarily entailed releasing known
murderers before trial.
These concerns were unfounded and, in fact, contrary to the Court’s ruling
in that very case. The Court was correct that in all non-capital cases a defendant had
a right to demand that a judge consider bail. However, no defendant had an
inexorable right to be released on bail. Indeed, the question in the case was resolved
against the misdemeanant who had been denied bail pending appeal. The Court held
that, absent “extraordinary” circumstances, it would be proper for a trial court to
deny bail pending appeal.103 That resolution is hard to square with the Court’s
commentary on the consequences of eliminating capital punishment, but the Court’s
commentary stands as another example of elite resistance to abolition of the death
penalty that had been brought about by “[t]he people of Arizona.”104
Simultaneously, press outlets exploited what they said was the first
lynching in a generation to argue that abolition had unleashed this substitute means
of vengeance.105 Rather than let authorities hold a perpetrator of “cold-blooded
murder” and “unspeakable outrage against woman” for safekeeping at the state
prison, civilians disrupted his transport and hung him at a telephone pole. 106 The
Copper Camp wrote that the maximum penalty under the law fell short “in the
estimation of all right thinking people of what this wretch deserved.” 107 Instead of
accurately reporting that the victim of this lynching would have, if convicted, likely
faced life in prison, the paper placed blame for the lynching on what were, in its
view, lenient laws: “As for the good people who deplore the fact that the mob took
the law in its own hands we would say that there was no law in existence to fit the
crime.”108 Thus, The Copper Camp explicitly blamed Hunt for the lynching.109
Indeed, editors across Arizona attributed the lynching to the “weakening of the
state’s criminal law.”110
On top of concerns about released convicts and lynching, local papers
strained to portray a violent crime boom, invoking misleading statistics to falsely
101.
Id. at 265.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 267.
104.
Id. at 265.
105.
Lynch Law in Arizona, ARIZ. COPPER CAMP, May 12, 1917, at 2,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn95060578/1917-05-12/ed-1/seq-2/
[https://perma.cc/K3WD-5YZH].
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
Lynching Due to Weakening of Criminal Law, Say Editors-Abolition of
Capital Punishment through Efforts of Former Governor Blamed for Lynch Law, ARIZ.
COPPER
CAMP,
May
19,
1917,
at
3,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn95060578/1917-05-19/ed-1/seq-/,
[https://perma.cc/4A2K-DASP].
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connect abolition to rising crime rates. According to The Arizona Republican,
homicides “of the most frightfully revolting character” increased within six months
of the election.111 More than twice the number of Maricopa County homicides were
reported a year after abolition than reported during any other year, the Mohave
County Miner echoed.112
The Miner also advocated for the death penalty as a means of preventing
crime. The doubling of homicides “shows the necessity of capital punishment, not
because of the likelihood of hanging a few measley [sic] criminals, but for the
deterrant [sic] effect it will have on the criminal element.”113
During this time, brothers John and Tom Power, sons of a rancher in the
Galiuro Mountains, recruited a paroled convict and attempted to evade the draft by
killing federal officers in what became the deadliest shootout in Arizona. 114 The
Winslow Mail attributed the gun battle and other strife to the penal code change.
“Arizona is still reaping the bitter fruits of the abolition of capital punishment. Three
peace officers have been killed in cold blood . . . . The crime of murder is more
common than cattle stealing, and the state is being infested with thugs and outlaws
to ply their criminal practices with the aid of guns.”115
The defendants were convicted of first-degree murder and received the
most severe punishment remaining, a sentence of life in prison with the possibility
of parole.116 Feelings ran so high over the murders that public sentiment shifted in
favor of the death penalty.117 In the months that followed, people circulated petitions
to place another initiative measure on the ballot in November 1918 that would
reinstate the death penalty. 118 The measure received wide support and repealed the
1916 Abolition of Death Penalty Act.119
The Arizona Republican had predicted this outcome in 1913. The editors
posited that if people could be “assured that a life term would be a life term,” then
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Murder and Punishment, ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, May 6, 1917, at 4,
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much of the opposition to abolition would abate.120 And The Arizona Republican
was correct, although it would be generations before life without parole was widely
adopted as an alternative to the death penalty.
Today, public support for the death penalty plummets when survey
subjects121 and juries122 are given an alternative option of life without the possibility
of parole.123 It plummets further when people learn that the typical profile of capital
defendants includes severe mental illness, intellectual disabilities, post-traumatic
stress disorder, traumatic brain injuries, or other significant impairments. 124 Jury
instructions on parole ineligibility are obviating public safety concerns that had
contributed to the reinstatement of capital punishment.125
Further, in contrast to the elitist press’s predictions about “lynch law”
erupting in Arizona, sociologists have since observed that progressive-era abolition
in Arizona and elsewhere at most provided a convenient rationalization for lynching
and was not a cause of it.126 Other studies published then and now show that lynching
occurred regardless of whether capital punishment was in effect.127
120.
The Pardoning Power, ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, Feb. 19, 1913, at 4,
https://www.proquest.com/hnparizonarepublicanshell/docview/761857834/pageviewPDF/B
9B300C64EF94C6APQ/1?accountid=8360 [https://perma.cc/P6RQ-R5N7].
121.
Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 197 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“General public support for the death penalty also plummets when the survey subjects are
given the alternative of life without parole.”).
122.
See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 79 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
studies, and noting that “the available sociological evidence suggests that juries are less likely
to impose the death penalty when life without parole is available as a sentence”); see also
O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 172 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he decline in
the number of death sentences has been attributed to the fact that juries in Virginia must now
be informed of the life-without-parole alternative.”).
123.
Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 197.
124.
Justice Research Group & Data for Progress, The Modern American Death
Penalty
Is
Massively
Unpopular
at
2
(Feb.
17,
2022)
https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/review?uri=urn%3Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A48b7905da04b-39e4-92c1-508d39a63701#pageNum=1 [https://perma.cc/S2SD-CANA] (reporting
that, e.g., 60% of voters oppose seeking death sentences for people with severe mental illness;
59% oppose for people with intellectual impairments; and 63% oppose for people with a
traumatic brain injury).
125.
See generally Galliher et al., supra note 87.
126.
Id. at 575.
127.
Id. (citing J.E. Cutler, Capital Punishment and Lynching, 29 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 182 (1907)); Charles David Phillips, Exploring Relations Among
Forms of Social Control: The Lynching and Execution of Blacks in North Carolina, 18891918, 21 L. & Soc. Rev. 361, 363 (1987); LOUIS P. MANSUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865 (1989)).
Nineteenth century progressives opposed capital punishment generally and public executions
specifically for reasons similar to their opposition to lynching. In both instances they were
concerned with maintaining the rule of law without stoking public sentiment against
politically unpopular groups. Id. The other premise of proponents of reinstatement—
deterrence through execution—was questioned at the time and has been subject to
contemporary criticism. John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment,
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And even the reporting on increased crime after abolition appears to be
misguided. In at least some places, homicide rates fell.128 Simultaneously, there was
increased hate-based violence, including lynchings against labor activists and
striking workers.129 Thus, many bases for early support of the death penalty, pressed
by opponents of the progressive goals of the founders, were built on false
assumptions.

II. THE EARLY COURTS AND THE MEANING OF ARIZONA’S CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE
In 2008, state authorities placed minimum-security arrestee William
Wright with a medium-security inmate in “Tent City,”130 an outdoor, 100-degree
jail, with questionable supervision and without air conditioning.131 Authorities
denied Tent City habitants access to cigarettes or coffee and offered only “scanty
and unappetizing” food.132 The state official who designed the policy of housing
inmates in tents acknowledged that the heat made inmates irritable and tense.133 The
medium-security inmate, who had been convicted previously of aggravated assault,
soon fractured Wright’s orbital bone.134
Wright sued, arguing that the conditions violated his state and federal
rights.135 Instead of analyzing Wright’s claims independently and applying the
original meaning of Arizona’s Constitution, an Arizona state court followed Eighth
Amendment standards for “cruel and unusual punishments.” 136 Under the Eighth
Amendment, incarcerated people who challenge prison or jail conditions—
including inadequate food and medical care—must show that the jailer or warden
acted with “deliberate indifference” to a risk of serious harm. Decades of experience
have proven that this standard is nearly impossible to meet, even with compelling
claims of horrific conditions.137 In Wright’s case, the court concluded that the
situation did not violate his rights because Tent City did not impose a “substantial
risk of violence.”138

America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 311–
12 (2009).
128.
Clare V. McKanna Jr., Alcohol, Handguns, and Homicide in the American
West: A Tale of Three Counties, 1880-1920, 26 W. HIST. Q. 455, 473 Fig. 5 (1995) (reporting
drop in homicides in two counties and very little change in a third).
129.
See Kathleen Belew, Lynching and Power in the United States: Southern
Western, and National Vigilante Violence, 12 HIST. COMPASS 84, 96 (2014).
130.
Wright v. Maricopa Cty., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0493, 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 781, at *10–14 (Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2008).
131.
Flanders v. Maricopa Cty., 54 P.3d 837, 841–42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Wright, 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS at *3–4.
135.
Id.
136.
Id. at 10.
137.
See Andrea Clare Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind: Enhancing Public
Transparency of Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 461 (2014) (describing
PLRA restrictive requirements generally).
138.
Wright, 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS at *10–14
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In contrast, at the time of statehood, and decades before the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment applies to the states, Arizona courts
understood cruel and unusual punishment to mean “unreasonable and harsh
treatment.”139 This is just not a semantic difference. In 1925, for example, the
Arizona Supreme Court concluded that placing convicted prisoner C.E. Howard
alone in a basement with only bread and water for 30 days was “unreasonable and
harsh treatment” that the Arizona Constitution did not tolerate.140 This conclusion
represented the aim of the state’s penal system at its founding. According to the
1925 Court, “our state at present adheres to the general policy, that while for the
protection it is necessary to deprive the offender against its laws of his liberty for a
greater or lesser period, yet such deprivation should be conducted as humanely as
possible.”141 The ultimate goal of penalizing a prisoner was “restoring him as a
useful citizen to society.”142 While Mr. Howard accepted his court sentence of seven
to ten years in prison for perjury, he argued that, with such deleterious conditions,
the warden imposed a more severe sentence than the one the judge issued. The Court
agreed and held that the prison violated Howard’s right to basic human dignity,
grounded in what it saw as two interwoven state rights to due process and freedom
from excessive punishment:
From the Magna Carta down to our own Constitution (Article II,
§§ 4 [Due Process], 15), with its reaffirmation that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
and that no cruel nor unusual punishment shall be inflicted, the
rule is the same.143
The Court held that incarceration under inhumane conditions amounts to
the executive increasing the severity of the punishment, contrary to law. 144 By this
standard, Tent City—which by design placed people in brutal, hostile conditions
that would undermine rather than promote reform goals—likely ran afoul of the
Arizona Constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. But despite this
precedent that reflects the original meaning, the Court in Wright’s case never
conducted this analysis.
In addition to restricting unreasonable and harsh treatment, there are other
ways in which Arizona’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was originally
139.
Howard v. State, 237 P. 203, 205 (Ariz. 1925). Howard was decided over three
decades before the Supreme Court of the United States announced its seminal Eighth
Amendment standard requiring that the meaning of the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
140.
Howard, 237 P. at 205.
141.
Id. at 204.
142.
Id. (explaining that “our state at present adheres to the general policy,
that . . . deprivation [of liberty] should be done as humanely as possible” and should be with
the goal of “restoring [the inmate] as a useful citizen to society”).
143.
Id.
144.
Id. Howard was later overturned, not on the merits, but for the remedy it
applied, using the contempt power to adjudicate whether confinement was cruel. See Ridgway
v. Superior Court, 245 P.2d 268, 273–74 (Ariz. 1952) (holding that any violation was not
“redressible [sic] by contempt” related to a court’s order sentencing a person to confinement).
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understood to provide more robust legal protections than what the Eighth
Amendment provides today. In particular, Founding-era courts also recognized a
right to an individualized sentence145 and a right to bail.146 For example, some 70
years ago, a bail set at $75,000 for Charles Gusick’s sodomy charge and the same
sum for fellatio charges did not pass originalist muster. 147
Within the original meaning of Article II, § 15, “excessive” bail was that
which “prevent[s] the prisoner from being admitted to bail.”148 In other words, the
accused’s ability to pay, based on his own financial circumstances and “the
possession of friends able and willing to give bail for him,” is one of the factors that
courts must consider when fixing bail.149 Further, Article II, § 15 prohibits denying
bail for the purpose of “punishing a person.”150 As such, the Arizona Supreme Court,
in 1951, ordered a $30,000 bail reduction for each of Mr. Gusick’s charges and
ordered his release.
By contrast, more recently, pretrial detainees have died because of
dangerous jailhouse conditions that they faced only because they could not afford to
make bail. In 2019, David Ray Maxwell,151 held on a $7,500 bond,152 and Francisco
Ruiz,153 denied pretrial release on unrelated charges,154 became unresponsive after
Pima County Jail detention guards used force against each man. Ruiz had just been
booked into a minimum-security facility when staff placed him in handcuffs and

145.
State v. Harold, 246 P.2d 178, 183 (Ariz. 1952) (“It has been the practice of
the courts of this state from statehood based upon sound principles that the trial judge in
imposing a sentence for the violation of any criminal offense may and does take into
consideration whether the defendant has been previously convicted of the same or similar
offense. This is the very purpose of the indeterminate sentence.”).
146.
Gusick v. Boies, 233 P.2d 446, 447 (Ariz. 1951).
147.
Id.
148.
Id. at 448 (quoting People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 173 N.E. 8, 9 (Ill. 1930)).
149.
Id.
150.
Id. at 448.
151.
See Danyelle Khmara & Shaq Davis, Officials ID Tucson Jail Inmate Who
Died After Fight with Corrections Officer, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://tucson.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/officials-id-tucson-jail-inmate-who-diedafter-fight-with-corrections-officer/article_b70d990e-30b9-11e9-a905-93d4f6ba042f.html
[https://perma.cc/UHQ4-J2RX].
152.
Pretrial Detention Should Not Be a Death Sentence, TUCSON SECOND CHANCE
CMTY. BAIL FUND (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.tucsonbailfund.org/pretrial-detentionshould-not-be-a-death-sentence/ [https://perma.cc/CET6-G4AZ]; see also Andrea Craig
Armstrong, Prison Medical Deaths and Qualified Immunity, 112 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
79, 82 (2022) (explaining that “the leading cause of death in carceral spaces (including jails
and prisons) is medical illness.”).
153.
Dylan Smith, Inmate Dead After ‘Encounter’ with Pima County Jail Guards,
TUCSON
SENTINEL
(Nov.
19,
2019),
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/111919_jail_death/inmate-dead-afterencounter-with-pima-county-jail-guards/ [https://perma.cc/JWB9-C3CE].
154.
For Immediate Release: Local activists claim recent jail deaths are linked to
corruption, racism and a culture of violence in the Pima County Sheriff’s Department,
TUCSON SECOND CHANCE CMTY. BAIL FUND (Sept. 30, 2020), https://tucsonbailfund.org/forimmediate-release/ [https://perma.cc/CZK8-MN9H].
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shackles to evaluate him for “acting strangely.”155 Maxwell had spent more than a
year in jail awaiting trial.156 Soon after, seventy-six-year-old Ricardo Sena Pascual
III was detained in the same facility on a $7,500 bond.157 He was found unresponsive
by guards making their rounds.
When Mr. Gusick, in 1951, was unable to afford bail and denied pretrial
release, he did not die before his day in court, unlike the three recent pretrial
detainees. The Court held that Mr. Gusick’s ability to pay must be considered—and
robustly enforced—in setting bail in light of his individual circumstances.
This state of affairs exists in part because the current Arizona courts have
too often failed to account for the original public meaning in assessing whether bail
is appropriate in a given case, as affirmed in Mr. Gusick’s case. For example, the
Arizona Court of Appeals held that the federal and state Due Process Clauses did
not require a defendant to be competent at the time of his bail hearing,158 despite the
repeated emphasis the founders placed on the importance of bail. 159 Moreover, the
modern Arizona courts have not read Arizona’s bail provisions in harmony with the
other limitations on punishment that the founders imposed.160
Early decisions from the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that an
individualized determination at sentencing “has been the practice of the courts of
this state from statehood.”161 The context for that particular observation was
explicating “the purpose of the indeterminate sentence,” a legislative practice that
has since been supplanted.162 But the historical practice at the founding was to
provide a sentence that was “graduated and proportioned to” both the offender and
the offense.163
In keeping with the founders’ understanding of “cruel” and “excessive,”
John C. Phillips, a founding sentencing judge (who later became a legislator and

155.
Melissa Egan, Inmate Described As ‘Combative’ Before Death at Pima
County Jail, KOLD (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.kold.com/2019/11/28/report-inmatedescribed-combative-before-death-pima-county-jail/ [https://perma.cc/CET6-G4AZ].
156.
Khmara & Davis, supra note 151.
157.
Dylan Smith, Inmate Found Dead in Pima County Jail Cell, TUCSON SENTINEL
(Oct. 19, 2020) https://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/101920_inmate_death/inmatefound-dead-pima-county-jail-cell/ [https://perma.cc/AY9V-2W82].
158.
Sills v. Coates, 506 P.3d 28, 30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
159.
See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §§ 15, 22. In other cases, where the courts have
specifically addressed the limitations on pre-conviction detention imposed by the founders
the Arizona courts have, time and again, struck down undue limitations on the availability of
pre-trial release. See, e.g., Simpson v. Miller, 387 P.3d 1270, 1278–79 (Ariz. 2017) (holding
unconstitutional under Article II, § 22 a statute the categorically eliminated bail for sex
offenses against a minor because such offenses are not “inherently predictive of future
dangerousness,” a required consideration under § 22).
160.
See Khmara & Davis, supra note 151; see Smith, supra note 153; Smith, supra
note 157.
161.
State v. Harold, 246 P.2d 178, 183 (Ariz. 1952).
162.
Id.
163.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
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governor),164 declared from the bench in 1913 that he opposed capital punishment. 165
Judge Phillips served as territorial probate judge from 1902 to 1912, and under the
new statehood laws became the first Maricopa County Superior Court judge. 166 His
1913 protest of capital punishment followed a death sentence that, he said, the penal
code forced him to impose on defendant William Faltin. 167 In denying Faltin’s
motion for a new trial,168 Phillips remarked that “if he had ever felt a repugnance”
to capital punishment before, “he certainly did at that moment.” 169 And as described
above, the judge’s view would soon win the day with the founding generation, when
voters in 1916 abolished capital punishment statewide.
But ever since the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1962 that the Eighth
Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Arizona Supreme Court has equated the meaning of Article II, § 15
to that of its federal counterpart170 and refused to recognize the original meaning of
cruel and unusual punishment.171 As we detail below, the Arizona Supreme Court
has emphasized the importance of the views of the founders but failed to engage
with what those views actually were.

III. THE CLAUSE AS PART OF THE WHOLE
Crucially, Arizona’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does not exist
in isolation. Rather, it must be read and understood in harmony with the entire text
of the Constitution, particularly other clauses relating to criminal sanctions. The
Arizona Supreme Court has tacitly endorsed this approach, and it is part and parcel

164.
NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
GOVERNORS OF THE UNITED STATES 1899-1978 (Robert Sobel & John Raimo eds., Meckler
Books 1978), https://www.nga.org/governor/john-c-phillips/ [https://perma.cc/MU8Y5GGF].
165.
Faltin Dies on April 18-That Is Unless There Should Be InterventionSentenced Passed Upon the Murderer of Carl Peterson Yesterday Morning, ARIZ.
REPUBLICAN, Feb. 9, 1913, at 12, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020558/191302-09/ed-1/seq-12/ [https://perma.cc/AP9Q-939H].
166.
NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, supra note 164,
167.
Faltin Dies, supra note 166 (“[Judge Phillips took] occasion to say that he was
opposed to capital punishment and if he had ever felt a repugnance to it before, he certainly
did at that moment.”).
168.
See Faltin v. State, 151 P. 952, 955 (Ariz. 1915).
169.
See id. (proceeding subsequent to “APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior
Court of the County of Maricopa, J. C. Phillips, Judge. Affirmed.”).
170.
See generally Bradley N. Mumford, Comment, Make It Mean Something: The
Case for Broader Protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Arizona
Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 453, 460 (2009) (“Arizona courts have failed to affirmatively
decide to what extent article II, section 15 of the Arizona Constitution differs, if at all, from
the Eighth Amendment. Since the United States Supreme Court handed down Solem, the
Arizona Supreme Court has been unable to improve on the complicated formula it received
to evaluate claims of cruel and unusual punishment. It is easy to understand the difficulty,
considering the vast amount of confusion and disagreement that existed even among the
members of the United States Supreme Court.”).
171.
See State v. Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d 34, 44 (Ariz. 2020); State v. Bush, 423 P.3d
370, 393 (Ariz. 2018), State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 67–68 (Ariz. 2003).
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with textualism and originalism.172 Of course construing the same word used in
separate provisions in similar ways is consistent with an originalist and textualist
understanding of Arizona’s Constitution.173 But as Justice Scalia has noted,
understanding a clause as part of the whole text requires more:174 specifically, one
constitutional provision can shed light on another, or the two can even be seen as
“enhancing each other.”175 State courts regularly undertake this approach when
construing topically related provisions of their respective constitutions. For
example, Montana interprets its Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as enhanced
by its provision guaranteeing human dignity, and other states have undertaken a
similar approach in other contexts.176
Arizona should be no exception. Consider Arizona’s constitutional
protections for children. The same progressive philosophy that informed Arizona’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause also led to a separate provision, Article XXII,
§ 16, that prohibited detaining youth with adult offenders and recognized the state’s
unique obligation to protect and rehabilitate even “so-called incorrigible” children.
Simply following Eighth Amendment law in juvenile cases ignores this unique
feature of Arizona’s Constitution, with often brutal results.
In 1994, Angela Leeman was convicted of 13 counts of child abuse and
two drug charges for conduct that occurred before she turned 18. Even though her
abusive and much older adult “boyfriend” was charged as the principal, she received
a much longer sentence that made her ineligible for release until she was 78 years
old.177 Ms. Leeman’s case was but one of several in which the Arizona state courts
affirmed similarly lengthy sentences for juvenile convictions. 178 In doing so, the
courts have repeatedly declined to “extend” the protections of the Arizona
Constitution beyond the minimum protections required by the Supreme Court of the

172.
SCALIA, supra note 3, at 153 (“When construing the United States Constitution
in McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall rightly called for ‘a fair construction
of the whole instrument.’”).
173.
See Akhhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748 (1999)
(“In deploying [intratextualism], the interpreter tries to read a contested word or phrase that
appears in the Constitution in light of another passage in the constitution featuring the same
(or a very similar) word or phrase.”).
174.
SCALIA, supra note 3, at 153.
175.
Robert F. Williams, Enhanced State Constitutional Rights: Interpreting Two
or More Provisions Together, 2021 Wisc. L. Rev. 1001, 1003 (2021).
176.
See Quigg v. Slaughter, 154 P.3d 1217, 1223 (Mont. 2007); State v. Keefe, 478
P.3d 830, 843 (2021) (McGrath, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that Montana’s constitutional protections for children should enhance the protections
provided by its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments); see also generally Williams,
supra note 175, at 1002 (discussing cases of one state constitutional provision enhancing the
protections provided by another).
177.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 3, Leeman v. Arizona, No. 18-1267, 2019
WL 1490167 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2019).
178.
See State v. Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d 34, 44 (Ariz. 2020) (addressing several
similarly situated defendants in a consolidated case).
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United States.179 But even in declining to “extend” Eighth Amendment protections
in cases like Ms. Leeman’s, the Arizona state courts have minimized the extent of
its protection. For example, even while acknowledging that juveniles cannot
constitutionally be sentenced to life without parole unless they have committed
murder, the Court has held that a term-of-years sentence that exceeds life expectancy
for multiple offenses, even coming out of a single offense, does not violate the
Eighth Amendment.180
But moving in lockstep with the Eighth Amendment precedent in these
cases—and holding that “cruel and unusual” in Arizona means nothing more—
ignores the unique protections for children in the Arizona Constitution and why they
exist. The Arizona framers presumed that any juvenile would reform in the care of
the correctional system and insisted that such reform was the primary purpose of
that system.181 Constitutional Convention delegates wrote Article XXII, § 16
(“Confinement of minor offenders”) to ensure it.182 Yuma County Delegate E.L.
Short condemned the territorial system, which he felt failed to give “our boys and
girls in this state” the “consideration” that their youth demanded.183 At the time of
the Convention, if a woman’s cell was not available in Yuma, juvenile defendants
were placed in a corridor where they mingled with adult male prisoners.
After hearing of such “neglect,” delegates declared that legislative
protections will never extend far enough to guard these children against harm. Thus,
they cemented in the state Constitution protections for juvenile offenders beyond
those provided in even the U.S. Constitution: “It shall be unlawful to confine any
minor under the age of eighteen years, accused or convicted of crime, in the same
section of any jail or prison in which adult prisoners are confined. Suitable quarters
shall be prepared for the confinement of such minors.”184 To applause, Maricopa
County Delegate F.A. Jones said that the provision will operate as “a declaration of
the rights of the children.” 185
Upon statehood, Hunt emphasized in his first message to the legislature the
state’s constitutional obligation to care for the “so-called incorrigible” children of
the state: “The constitution, among its many splendid provisions, has few better than
that one which throws a protecting arm about dependent, neglected, incorrigible or
delinquent children, and children accused of crime, under the age of eighteen

179.
State v. Valencia, No. 2 CA-CR 2019-0207, 2020 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS
854, at *11 n.1 (Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2020) (“Valencia alternatively argues we should extend
the protections of the Arizona Constitution beyond those of the Eighth Amendment. But as
we have repeatedly noted our supreme court has declined to do so.”) (internal citations
omitted).
180.
Soto-Fong, 474 P.3d at 45.
181.
JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA AS PROVIDED
FOR BY THE ENABLING ACT OF CONGRESS APPROVED JUNE 20, 1910, 272 (Cronin ed., State
Law and Legislative Reference Library 1925).
182.
Id. at 274.
183.
Id.
184.
ARIZ. CONST. art. XXII, §16.
185.
JOURNAL, supra note 181.
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years.”186 Hunt made it explicit that, under the Constitution, the state criminal
system would not treat youth in ways similar to adults. Instead, the state’s
Constitution demanded that the state provide a “shield” between “the young boys
and girls whose unhappy environment, parentage or misfortune” and the
“heartlessness of a system containing no thought of humanity.”187 That differential
treatment was in service of the view that “few children are naturally criminal, even
though they may have committed some criminal act, but I am convinced that many
are made criminals, in legal parlance, by due process of law.” 188
Hunt’s and the other framers’ understanding of the juvenile detention
provision is essential to understanding Article II, § 15. The state Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause must be interpreted in harmony with the entire text of the state
Constitution, the Clause as part of the whole. This is in part because the same
philosophy of criminal punishment that animated the clause to protect children
supported the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.189 Indeed, early Arizona
Supreme Court decisions applied this principle to construe the meanings of “cruel
and unusual,” “punishment,” and “bail,” and the founding-era views on other
provisions of the Constitution clarify the scope of Article II, § 15’s limitations on
extreme sanction.
A. Article XXII, § 22, Judgments of Death
In the summer of 2021, the Arizona Department of Corrections was
deliberating whether to use a lethal injection or the gas chamber to execute Frank
Atwood and Clarence Dixon.190 As the state prepared to kill Atwood and Dixon, it
became public that the Department of Corrections had obtained the same lethal gas
used by the German government to exterminate Jews in gas chambers.191 After
World War II, the International Military Tribunal convicted the gas chamber

186.
George W. P. Hunt, Governor, Message of Governor Geo. W. P. Hunt to the
First Legislature of Arizona, ARIZ. REPUBLICAN, Mar. 19, 1912, at 2,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020558/1912-03-19/ed-1/seq-10.pdf; see also
Legis. Hist., 1st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. Vol. 1 at 68 (Ariz. 1912),
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/p17220coll18/id/17.
187.
Hunt, supra note 186. See also Legis. Hist., 1st Leg., supra note 186.
188.
Hunt, supra note 45; see also Legis. Hist., 1st Leg., supra note 186.
189.
SCALIA, supra note 3, at 153 (“When construing the United States Constitution
in McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall rightly called for “a fair construction
of the whole instrument.”).
190.
Robert Anglen, Lawyers: State Botched Purchase of Gas Chamber Chemical
in
Effort
to
Resume
Executions,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC
(June
4,
2021),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2021/06/04/arizonasupplies-death-penalty-gas-drug-called-into-question/7535904002/ [https://perma.cc/3EX4WQW3] (“Nearly 30 years after Arizona voters abolished the gas chamber, the Department
of Corrections is buying supplies to make poison gas and preparing to execute death row
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architects of war crimes.192 Other concerns have focused on long and gruesome
executions and the state’s admitted purchase of spoiled chemicals. Arizona officials
maintained that they were fulfilling “constitutional obligations” by preparing to
execute these men in this fashion.193
The officials may have misspoken. Nowhere does the Arizona Constitution
obligate the state to carry out any form of execution. Perhaps they were referencing
a legislative obligation, imposed via state statute. If they really did mean
“constitutional,” perhaps they meant to invoke Article XXII, § 22, which contains
the phrases “lethal injection” and “lethal gas,” under the subtitle “Judgments of
Death.” But a closer look at the history and construction of that constitutional clause
belies a conclusion that it or any constitutional provision requires capital
punishment.
First, the original Arizona Constitution did not contain those phrases, nor
did it explicitly mention capital punishment,194 or include any similar wording.
Second, the people of Arizona added the “Judgments of Death” Clause (Article XXII
§ 22) through a 1933 referendum to minimize any anguish after the state made
mistakes identical to those of the 2021 Department of Corrections.195 The
amendment and a subsequent 1992 revision aimed to mitigate the harshness of the
death penalty statute, as reflected by the historical record and contemporaneous case
law.
Upon reinstatement of capital punishment in 1918, the method of execution
was hanging. In 1930, Eva Dugan was decapitated under her own weight when the
Department of Corrections caused her long drop from the gallows.196 This execution
generated revulsion so widespread that Hunt—still a death penalty opponent—asked

192.
Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and the Quest for
Global Justice, 8 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 45, 105 (2002).
193.
Anglen, supra note 190. The State of Arizona executed Clarence Dixon on
May 11, 2022, and Frank Atwood on June 8, 2022. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
Executions
Database,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/executiondatabase?sort=dateString/asc&page=31
[https://perma.cc/5E6S-2GCF;
https://perma.cc/9A6R-GLF4].
194.
To be sure, the constitution as originally drafted made reference to rights that
must be honored before the state deprive its citizen of life. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 4. But, as
others have explained, “there is no reason to suppose that [conferring these rights] somehow
nullifies other constitutional prohibitions—most importantly, the ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.” Joseph Blocher, The Death Penalty and the Fifth Amendment, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 275, 278 (2016).
195.
ARIZONA OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF ARIZONA INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM
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4
(1933),
https://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/statepubs/id/10758 (proposing amendment
to the constitution to provide for lethal gas as the method of carrying out judgments of death).
196.
Campaign Against Capital Punishment, COOLIDGE EXAM’R, ,Apr. 18, 1930, at
3,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn94050542/1930-04-18/ed-1/seq-3/
[https://perma.cc/8W9B-V6ZR](“More interest in the abolition of the death penalty has been
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the legislature to enact a means of capital punishment less barbarous and revolting
than hanging.197
Through the 1933 ballot initiative, the people replaced the gallows with
lethal gas. In preparing to perform the first execution by lethal gas, the warden of
the state penitentiary said that the gas chamber is “quicker and more humane” than
Arizona’s old gallows.198
The courts made similar observations. In Hernandez v. State, the first
judicial interpretation of the lethal gas provision, the 1934 Court observed that gas
had been “used for years by dental surgeons for the purpose of extracting teeth
painlessly.”199 As such, the Court reasoned that the use of gas is “more humane and
less barbarous than hanging” as well as “less painful and more humane than
hangings.”200
The public realized this was not so in 1992, during the first gas chamber
execution since the end of World War II.201 The death of condemned man Donald
Eugene Harding202 lasted eleven painful, convulsion-wracked minutes and shocked
many Arizonans.203 The people quickly sought to codify an alternative mechanism
for carrying out the death penalty statute. In response, the editorial board of the
Arizona Daily Star endorsed a 1992 ballot amendment under the headline, “Bring a
bit of mercy to brutal death penalty.”204 At the time, science persuaded the people
and courts205 that lethal injection was “the most merciful method” 206 of execution
possible. The amendment passed overwhelmingly, by a vote of 1,040,535 to
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200.
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Chris Limberis, 1st Execution in State Since Nears –– As Lawyers Appeal,
Debate Is Renewed, ARIZ DAILY STAR, Feb. 24, 1992, at 13 (describing first lethal gas
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A Bit of Mercy, supra note 201.
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314,919.207 The revision208 required the use of lethal injection for any future
execution and provided an option of gas or injection for any future execution of an
inmate sentenced before 1992.209
As the original meaning of the “Judgments of Death” section reflects, it is
directed at making punishment in the state less cruel. And nothing about that
provision necessitates a conclusion that the state Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause would not bar execution.210 Far from reinforcing the constitutionality of
capital punishment, this Clause is an effort to bring some mercy into the Constitution
after vested elite interests reinstated the death penalty. It is far more a step toward
abolition than a rejection of it. At a minimum, therefore, it cannot be used to argue
that capital punishment is not itself “cruel,” and it should also infuse the “Cruel and
Unusual” Clause with some idea of mercy.
B. Article II, the Declaration of Rights
Against Larry Wayne’s will, Maricopa County corrections staff regularly
administered a paralyzing drug with tormenting side effects to manage his
behavior.211 No court authorized the medication. No emergency required sedation.
The Arizona Supreme Court, in the 1986 decision Large v. Superior Court, likened
these chemical restraints to the “shackles of old.”212 The Court read the state
Constitution’s due process protections in Article II, § 4 of the Declaration together
with the Declaration’s Article II, § 16 prohibition on a conviction “work[ing]
corruption of blood” to hold that such punishment is unconstitutional. 213 Although
Arizona’s “corruption of blood” provision bears “some resemblance to” its federal
counterpart in Article III, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution, it is “more expansive” than
that provision. Like the federal prohibition, it rejects the “idea that children must
atone for the sins of their parents.”214 But Arizona’s provision goes further,
preventing as a general matter, a person from forfeiting property to the state by virtue
of having committed a crime.215 As described below, the Arizona courts have
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ARIZONA OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF ARIZONA INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM PUBLICITY PAMPHLET 16 (1992) (describing change from lethal gas to lethal
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option of choosing death by lethal gas.”).
210.
This is further demonstrated by other states having held the death penalty to
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212.
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213.
Id.; see also ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“No person shall be deprived of life,
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214.
LESHY, supra note 11, at 80.
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explained that this provision limits the state’s power to impose harsh conditions of
confinement.
In Large, the Court explained that although the legislature has the power to
punish and incarcerate those convicted of crimes, it lacks the power to “immobilize
and warehouse prisoners by using chemicals with known adverse consequences,
only to release them—possibly severely impaired—at the end of their sentence.”216
The Court concluded that “[s]uch an Orwellian result is not permitted by our state
constitution.”217 This decision relied in part on Howard, the 1925 decision holding
that the state’s Cruel and Unusual Clause prohibits corrections officials from
increasing the severity of sentences through needlessly harsh conditions. The Court
explained that the person’s status as a prisoner did not diminish his right to be free
from arbitrary chemical restraint.218
Howard’s treatment of the interaction of the ban on “corruption of blood”
and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause provides additional insights into the
Clause’s original meaning. There, the Court addressed whether it was constitutional
to be confined to “a dark cell or dungeon and for thirty days fed on bread and
water.”219
To answer that question, the Court turned to the “history of penal
legislation of the last hundred years in the United States, and particularly the last
generation in Arizona.”220 Interpreting the state’s Constitution, the Court concluded
that “our state at present adheres to the general policy, that while for the protection
it is necessary to deprive the offender against its laws of his liberty for a greater or
lesser period, yet such deprivation should be conducted as humanely as possible.” 221
The ultimate goal of that deprivation is “restoring him as a useful citizen to
society.”222
Founding-era views of the right to bail under Article II, § 22, “Bailable
offenses” also illuminate the scope of protections provided by the ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. This provision of the Declaration contains more details than
the Article II, § 15 prohibition on “excessive bail.”223 The founding generation’s
inclusion of not one but two provisions prohibiting the use of bail as a punishment
signifies an emphasis on freedom from undue confinement.224
In a 1913 case, the Arizona Supreme Court considered whether it was
constitutional to hold Roy Haigler without bail on a first-degree murder charge.225
In an opinion written by a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in the first year
of statehood, the Court explained that granting bail is “the rule and the refusal of it
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is the exception.”226 The Court explained that the bail right existed to prevent a
person accused of a crime from being “punished by imprisonment previous to his
conviction.”227 The Court required trial courts to presume innocence and remember
that “to grant bail is the rule and the refusal of it is the exception [because] the law
in its mercy so commands.”228
In Haigler, as in other early decisions, the Court checked the power of the
executive branch to “punish” by seeking out the meaning of the word in restrictions
on state conduct related to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.229
Thus, the founders were clear that the clauses of the constitution should be
read in conjunction with one another to give each clause meaning. What process
may be due and what punishments prohibited should be informed by the repeated
protection of minors in other parts of the document. What pretrial confinement
conditions run afoul of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause should be
informed by the limitations on refusing bail. These textual signals—all contained
within the same document—are powerful tools for understanding the scope of
Arizona’s constitutional limitations on punishment.

CONCLUSION
The founding-era views on cruel and unusual punishment and related
constitutional protections provide fertile ground for developing state constitutional
doctrines limiting extreme sanction and the administration of Arizona’s criminal
law. Such a vision would draw on the widely held founding view that the purpose
of punishment is reform and returning to society for those convicted of crimes. And
although it would mark a departure from the state’s current understanding of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, this reorientation would be explicitly
originalist in its approach. Twentieth century progressives dominated the Arizona
Constitutional Convention and infused Arizona’s founding document with
progressive ideals, including about limitations on punishments and the purposes of
them. The founding generation—through the people themselves, through their
seven-term progressive governor, and through the decisions of the judiciary—gave
those limitations meaning in ways that remain salient today.
Indeed, as the state resumed executions in May 2022—and will perhaps
soon undertake very many of them230—the original public meaning may have
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Although beyond the scope of this paper, more recent reforms to the
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bearing on a wide range of issues including a person’s competency to be executed,231
whether leaving a person under a sentence of death for decades is cruel and
unusual,232 and the constitutionality of the death penalty in and of itself.233 As
described above, the Arizona courts have declined to chart a course different from
their federal counterparts on each of these issues.
The Arizona courts have also declined to develop independent state
constitutional doctrines related to other severe sentences. This is so with regards to
proportionality determinations of lengthy sentences for adult conduct, 234 sentences
for criminal conduct by juveniles,235 and whether a fine is excessive.236 And
although Arizona applies a separate bail provision and related test, the resulting pretrial detentions do not differ from what would obtain under federal law. 237
An Arizona originalism, grounded in the meaning of the state Constitution
at the time of its enactment and elucidated by related text in the founding document,
might produce substantially different outcomes on each of these scores. Bail would
be only for the purpose of securing a person’s presence and ensuring community
safety, would be available to the rich and indigent alike, and would not in purpose
or effect impose punishment prior to a conviction absent compelling evidence of
guilt. Punishments would be scrutinized for whether they promote the rehabilitative
ideals embodied in twentieth century progressivism. Sentences that wholly forego
hope of rehabilitation—death in prison, whether by length of sentence or
execution—would be closely scrutinized and only permitted in the narrowest of
cases, if at all. Prison conditions that inflict needless suffering would be required to
give way to conditions that enable growth and reform.
But whatever the outcomes, Arizona’s constitutional history calls out for
the development of an independent state constitutional doctrine limiting extreme
sanction.
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